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1925 The common good consists of
three essential elements: respect for and promotion ofthe
fundamental rights of the person; prosperity, or the
development of the spiritual and temporal goods of society;
the peace and security of the group and of its
members. 1926 The dignity of the human person requires
the pursuit of the common good. Everyone should be
concerned to create and support institutions that improve
the conditions of human ljfe. 1927 It is the role of the state to defend and
promote the common good of civil society. The common good of
the whole human family calls for an organization of society
on the international level. 1928 Society ensures social justice when it provides the conditions 2832 that allow associations or individuals to obtain what is their due, according to their nature and their vocation. Social justice is linked to the common good and the exercise of authority.
1929 Social justice can be obtained only
in respecting the transcendent dignity of man. The
person represents the ultimate end of i88i society,
which is ordered to him: What is at
stake is the dignity of the human person, whose defence and
promotion have been entrusted to us by the Creator, and
to whom the men and women at every moment of history are
strictly and responsibly in
debt.35 1930 Respect for the human
person entails respect for the rights that flow from his
dignity as a creature. These rights are prior to 1700
society and must be recognized by it. They are the basis of
the moral legitimacy of every authority: by flouting them,
or refusing 1902 to recognize them in its positive
legislation, a society undermines its own moral
legitimacy.~6 If it does not respect them, authority can
rely only on force or violence to obtain obedience from its
subjects. It is the Church’s role to remind men of good
will of these rights, and to distinguish them from
unwarranted or false claims. 1931
Respect for the human person proceeds by way of respect for
the principle that ‘everyone should look upon his
neighbour 2212 (without any exception) as “another
self”, above all bearing in |
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